Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 157

Summary: - The offense of impugning the rights of the Amir. Established by the offender undertaking any positive activity capable of attaining the objective targeted by the offense, with knowledge of the effect of his activity in attaining that objective. Article 25, Law 31 of 1970. - Assessment of the existence of criminal intent in the offense of impugning the rights of the Amir. A factual matter. Its limit. The challenged judgment need not discuss it expressly and separately, provided it states that the words, writing, drawings, or other means of expressing thought used by the offender were performed, distributed, conveyed, or displayed by him to a number of people without distinction. The law does not require specific intent. - The judgment’s imposition of a single penalty for the two offenses because of their indivisible connection. That penalty falls within the range prescribed for the offense forming the first charge, which the judgment established the offender had committed and concerning which the judgment was free of defect. The complaint concerning the offense forming the second charge is ineffective. Rule: Article 25 of Law No. 31 of 1970 amending certain provisions of the Penal Code provides: “Whoever, publicly or in a place where he can be heard or seen by anyone in a public place, by speech, shouting, writing, drawings, pictures, or any other means of expressing thought, impugns the rights and authority of the Amir, disparages the person of the Amir, or affronts the seat of the Emirate shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.” This indicates that the offenses criminalized thereby, in both their material and mental elements, are established by the offender undertaking any positive activity capable of attaining the objective targeted by the offense, with knowledge of the effect of his activity in attaining that objective. The existence or absence of criminal intent therein is a factual matter for the trial court alone to determine without review, provided it bases its ruling on grounds supporting it. The judgment need not discuss any element of this offense expressly and separately, provided its account of the facts and circumstances of the case suffices to demonstrate its existence. So long as the words, writing, drawings, or other means of expressing thought used by the offender and broadcast, distributed, conveyed, or displayed by him to a number of people without distinction contain an attack on the rights and authority of the Amir, disparagement of his person, or an affront to the seat of the Emirate, his knowledge is then certain. The law does not require specific intent for this offense but is satisfied with general intent. In its account of the facts of the case—as stated above—the challenged judgment established against the appellant that he posted on the social networking site “Twitter” on the internet the expressions previously described, and that those expressions were such as to impugn, insult, and disparage the person of the Amir and affront the seat of the Emirate. The judgment demonstrated the existence of the element of publicity by relying on the statements of the officer involved in the incident that the appellant’s followers exceeded four thousand persons and that everyone could view these writings merely by accessing the aforementioned social networking sites using internet technology. What the appellant posted and wrote on the social networking site indicates the existence of the elements of knowledge and will on his part. Accordingly, what the judgment established above satisfies, in respect of the appellant, the offense forming the first charge in both its material and mental elements, as defined by law. After concluding that the appellant’s guilt of the two charges brought against him was established and that they were indivisibly connected, the challenged judgment imposed only a single penalty—pursuant to Article 84/1 of the Penal Code—namely imprisonment for two years with suspension of execution. This falls within the range of the penalty prescribed for the offense forming the first charge, which the judgment established the appellant had committed and concerning which it was free of the defect alleged by the appellant. Accordingly, what he raises concerning the second offense is ineffective.