Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 149

Summary: - Acquired rights. They must be respected even if acquired through administrative, regulatory or individual decisions. Basis thereof: the dictates of justice and natural law and the requirements of the public interest. Reason therefor. To secure the stability of legal positions, which may not be infringed under the provisions of the Kuwaiti Constitution. - Determining social status for acquiring ownership. The relevant status is that existing from approval of the allocation until expiry of the period it specified, with the remaining other conditions satisfied, without regard to any subsequent change thereto. Reason therefor. Such change falls outside the rules it laid down for establishing the right to acquire ownership. - The family under the government housing distribution system in force from 26/8/1962. Its meaning. A group consisting of a husband, a wife and their children, or some of this group, living in one household. Consequence thereof. Every individual in that group who lives separately from it falls outside the concept of the family. This must be observed when allocating these houses, whether upon initial allocation or upon amendment of the allocation. - Allocation of the government house—the subject of the dispute—to the appellant and her mother and its delivery to them as constituting a Kuwaiti family during 1976, and their obtaining a loan secured by it from the Credit and Savings Bank for its extension and renovation. Consequence thereof. The appellant's social status for acquiring ownership was determined from approval of the allocation. Issuance of Minister of State for Housing Affairs Decision No. 564/1993 requiring that the number of members of a family entitled to a government house be no fewer than two. This does not alter that conclusion. Reason therefor. It cannot affect the appellant's legal position, which became settled upon satisfaction of the conditions for her ownership of the disputed property. The challenged judgment's departure from this view. A defect requiring its cassation. Rule: It is established in the case law of this Court that the general principle, pursuant to natural law, is respect for acquired rights, even if acquired through administrative, regulatory or individual decisions. This is what justice dictates and the public interest requires, to secure the stability of legal positions, which may not be infringed under the provisions of the Kuwaiti Constitution. Likewise, the relevant social status for acquiring ownership is that existing from approval of the allocation until expiry of the period it specified, with the remaining other conditions satisfied, without regard to any subsequent change thereto, because such change falls outside the rules it laid down for establishing the right to acquire ownership. The family, under the government housing distribution system in force from 26/8/1962, means a group consisting of a husband, a wife and their children, or some of this group, living in one household. Accordingly, every individual in that group who lives separately from it falls outside the concept of the family. This concept must be observed when allocating these houses, whether upon initial allocation or upon amendment of the allocation. That being so, and as it is established by the papers that the government house—the subject of the dispute—was allocated to the appellant and her mother on 19/7/1976 and delivered to them as constituting a Kuwaiti family, and that they obtained a loan secured by it from the Credit and Savings Bank on 30/6/1980 for extension and renovation, the appellant's social status for acquiring ownership was therefore determined from approval of the allocation. This is not altered by the issuance of Minister of State for Housing Affairs Decision No. 564/1993 requiring that the number of members of a family entitled to a government house be no fewer than two, since it cannot affect the appellant's legal position, which became settled upon satisfaction of the conditions for her ownership of the disputed property, as explained above. Since the challenged judgment departed from this view and ruled to set aside the first-instance judgment and dismiss the appellant's action on the basis that she did not satisfy the conditions for housing welfare, contrary to the provisions of the law, this vitiates it and requires its cassation.