Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 190

Summary: - The trial court's determination of the nature of liability. It is not bound by what the injured party relied upon in seeking compensation or by the legal provision on which he relied. Its obligation, of its own motion, to determine its correct basis, ascertain the applicable legal rule, and apply it to the facts before it. This is not considered a change to the cause of action or its subject matter. The reason for this. Every right to compensation arising for the injured party against the person who inflicted or caused the harm is the direct cause of the action, however its forms may differ. Rule: It is established in the jurisprudence of this Court that, in determining the nature of liability, the trial court is not bound by what the injured party relied upon in seeking compensation or by the legal provision on which he relied. Rather, it must, of its own motion, determine the correct basis of liability, ascertain the legal rule applicable to the parties to the liability action, and apply it to the facts before it, without this being regarded as a change by it to the cause of action or its subject matter, since every right to compensation arising for the injured party against the person who inflicted or caused the harm is the direct cause of the action, however its forms may differ. The jurisprudence of this Court has settled that grounds of appeal extend to encompass whatever factual or legal grounds the appellant considers would lead to setting aside or varying the judgment appealed against; that it is not necessary to state all grounds of appeal in its statement, but stating some of them suffices; and that the appellant may add whatever other grounds he wishes without being bound by the time limit for the appeal or its service. He may also abandon the grounds stated in the statement in favor of other grounds. The Court of Appeal likewise has the right to base its judgment in favor of the appellant on grounds other than those contained in the statement of appeal. The legislature's entire purpose in requiring the grounds of appeal to be stated in its statement was to ensure the seriousness of the appeal, not to define its scope. It therefore suffices, for this statement to be considered fulfilled, to state these grounds in concise, meaningful wording that removes their ambiguity. That being so, and it being established in the jurisprudence of this Court that the trial court is obliged in every case to give the action its description and deduce its correct legal characterization, without being bound by the litigants' characterization of it, being constrained in this only by the facts before it, and that the decisive consideration in characterization is the true intent of the claims therein, not the words in which those claims were formulated, and that in this characterization it is subject to review by the Court of Cassation, the documents establish that the appellant initially brought his action seeking compensation on the basis that the first respondent's liability was established by the issuance of the criminal judgment in Felony No. 334/2000, Salwa Felonies, which convicted her, sentencing her to 3 years' imprisonment with labor and immediate enforcement and referring the civil action to the civil court, on the charge of issuing Cheque No. ....... drawn on Kuwait Finance House Bank in favor of the appellant for KD 68500 without an existing and withdrawable balance, in bad faith. That judgment became final and irrevocable upon the issuance of the judgment in Appeal No. 974 of 2002 affirming it and the cassation judgment numbered 272 of 2002, dated 20-1-2004, ruling that the proceedings had lapsed. That judgment acquired binding authority in establishing her fault in causing the harm suffered by the appellant, such that it may not be contradicted and what it adjudicated must be adhered to. He also relied on the tortious liability of the second respondent in his capacity, as the principal of his subordinates, because they facilitated the first respondent's escape abroad through the land border crossings immediately upon issuance of the criminal judgment convicting her. To substantiate his action, he submitted before the trial court photocopies of the aforementioned criminal judgments; a photocopy of the certificate issued by the Director of the Prosecution for Criminal Enforcement Affairs and International Cooperation, dated 1-6-2010, stating that the accused, the first respondent, entered the State of Bahrain on 16-5-2010; photocopies of the letter issued by the Liaison Division of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers—General Department of Criminal Investigation and Forensic Evidence, dated 25-5-2010, stating that the first respondent returned to her country, the State of Bahrain, and entered it on 25-5-2010; and the certificate issued by the Public Prosecution—Prosecution for Criminal Enforcement Affairs and International Cooperation—dated 2-10-2011, stating that the criminal court's order referring the civil action to the competent court had not been implemented by referring the case file to the Registry of the Court of First Instance to set a hearing for the action, from issuance of the final criminal judgment therein until that date. It is established in the jurisprudence of this Court that the grounds of a judgment are tainted by defective reasoning if they contain a defect affecting the soundness of the inference. This occurs if the court bases its conviction on evidence objectively unsuitable to persuade it, fails to understand the factual elements established before it, or encounters a contradiction between those elements, as where the conclusion reached by the court does not logically follow from those elements established before it. The Court of Cassation may intervene if the conclusion drawn does not legally accord with its premises.