Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 89

Summary: - Claim against the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour for the allowance prescribed for persons with disabilities pursuant to Law 49 of 1996 concerning the Care of Disabled Persons. Enactment of Law 8 of 2010 concerning the Rights of Persons with Disabilities before the action was brought, and its repeal of the first law. Consequence. The Director of the Public Authority for Disability Affairs, who is the proper party to the action under the latter law, must be joined as defendant. The challenged judgment's departure from this and its rejection of the plea that the action was inadmissible for being brought against a party lacking standing. An error requiring its cassation. Rule: It is established in the jurisprudence of this Court that a defendant has standing where the right claimed in the action exists against him, as the person concerned with it and responsible for it if the claimant's entitlement to it is established. Although determining the standing of the parties to an action is a question of fact which the trial court independently determines without review, this is conditional upon its inference being reasonable and having an established basis in the papers. That being so, and as the papers establish that the respondent, in his representative capacity, brought the action seeking his sister's entitlements previously granted to her as a person with a disability, as established by her disability certificate, which establishes that she suffers from a dual intellectual and motor disability, pursuant to Law No. 49 of 1996 concerning the Care of Disabled Persons, which was repealed by the aforementioned Law No. 8 of 2010; and as he lodged the statement of claim with the Registry on 17/6/2010, after the enactment of the latter law, which took effect from 28/5/2010, he was required to join as defendant in his action the “Director-General of the Public Authority for Disability Affairs,” the proper party in respect of the allowance claimed. Since the challenged judgment departed from this view and rejected the appellant's plea that the action was inadmissible for being brought against a person without entitlement, on the basis that the allowance claimed had previously been granted to the respondent in his representative capacity and that the amount claimed related to a period preceding the entry into force of Law No. 8 of 2010, and upheld the first-instance judgment ordering the appellant to pay that amount, it erred in applying the law, rendering it defective and requiring its cassation on this ground, without any need to examine the remaining grounds of appeal.