Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 176

Summary: - A principal perpetrator of an offence is a person who has the intent to contribute to or intervene in it with another, in pursuit of a common purpose constituting the ultimate objective of the offence, provided that the offence occurred as a result of their agreement and he contributed to some extent to its execution. Basis thereof. Article 47 of the Penal Code. - A person's presence at or near the scene of the offence with the intent to strengthen the perpetrator's resolve and overcome any resistance. Among the acts of assistance that make the person a principal perpetrator. - Inference of the existence of that intent. A matter of fact. Its condition. Rule: Article 47 of the Penal Code provides in its second paragraph that anyone who performs acts of assistance during the commission of an offence, or is present at or near the place where the offence is committed with the intent to overcome any resistance or strengthen the perpetrator's resolve, shall be deemed a perpetrator of the offence. The express wording and clear meaning of this provision show that anyone who has the intent to contribute to or intervene in an offence with another is deemed a principal perpetrator therein, provided that it occurred as a result of their agreement and he contributed to some extent to its execution in pursuit of a common purpose constituting the ultimate objective of the offence. The legislature regarded a person's presence at or near the scene of the offence with the intent to overcome any resistance or strengthen the perpetrator's resolve as an act of assistance that makes its perpetrator a principal perpetrator. Inference of the existence or absence of that intent is a matter exclusively for the trial court, provided that its inference is reasonable and supported by the circumstances of the incident and the attendant indications. It is also established that evidence need not be explicit and in itself indicative of the fact sought to be proved; rather, it is sufficient that its establishment be inferred from what is disclosed to the court in the circumstances and indications and by deriving conclusions from premises. What the judgment established—and for which it cited its evidence—namely that the second, third and fourth appellants accompanied the first appellant at the scene of the offence to strengthen his resolve and lend him support, suffices to regard the aforementioned appellants as perpetrators of the offence of premeditated intentional killing of which it convicted the second, third and fourth appellants. Accordingly, the criticism directed against it in this regard is unsound.