Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 95

Summary: - The crime of forgery of official papers or attempted forgery thereof. Its establishment. - Criminal intent exists where the perpetrator deliberately alters the truth with the intention of using it for the purpose for which it was forged. Assessment of its existence or absence is a matter of fact. Express discussion thereof in the judgment is unnecessary. The condition therefor. - The nature of attempt and when the perpetrator is considered to have attempted the crime. Assessment of which acts constitute a punishable attempt is a matter of fact. The condition therefor. Rule: The crime of forgery of an official document or attempted forgery thereof is established by the mere alteration of the truth in the document by one of the means prescribed by law, where the alteration is capable of creating the belief that it accords with the truth, and with the intention of using it for the purpose for which the truth was altered. Criminal intent in this crime exists where the perpetrator deliberately alters the truth in the official document with the intention of using it for the purpose for which it was forged. Assessment, from the circumstances of the case, of the existence or absence of this intent is a factual matter determined by the trial court without review. A valid conviction does not require the judgment to discuss criminal intent expressly and separately, so long as its reasons contain facts indicating it. Attempt, under Article 45 of the Penal Code, consists of committing an act with the intention of carrying out the crime where the perpetrator was unable, for reasons beyond his control, to complete his crime. It is established by beginning to execute an act immediately preceding execution of the material element of the crime in the course of committing the crime, which in itself leads immediately and directly to its commission, so long as the perpetrator’s intention in undertaking that act is known and established. The perpetrator is considered to have attempted the crime whether he exhausted his activity but nevertheless could not complete it, or was stopped against his will before performing all the acts he could have committed. Assessment of whether the acts committed by the perpetrator will not reach the commencement-of-execution stage and are therefore not punishable, or reached it and thus became a punishable attempt, falls within the trial judge’s authority to ascertain the facts of the case, provided that it rests on sound reasons. What the first-instance judgment, affirmed on its grounds by the challenged judgment, stated in its account of the case establishes all the legal elements of the two crimes of which it convicted the appellant—including criminal intent—and sufficiently answers the appellant’s assertions that those elements were absent. His complaint in this respect is therefore unsound.