Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 120

Summary: - A judgment rendered in criminal matters has no binding authority in a civil action if it did not determine the common basis of the civil and criminal actions and its legal characterization. - An award of compensation for injury based on fault established by the criminal order and in adherence to its binding authority concerning the incident of damage to the vehicle, without addressing the incident of injury, which was not before the court that issued the criminal order. The effect thereof: the common basis of the criminal and civil actions differs, and the criminal order therefore has no binding authority regarding compensation for the injury. The challenged judgment’s departure from this view and its award of compensation for the injury based on fault established by the criminal order. An error in applying the law requiring its cassation. Rule: It is established—in this Court’s jurisprudence—that the provision in the first paragraph of Article 54 of the Evidence Law that “The civil judge is bound by the criminal judgment only in respect of the facts determined by that judgment and whose determination was necessary ....” indicates that a judgment rendered in criminal matters has no binding authority in a civil action in respect of matters it did not necessarily determine concerning the facts constituting the common basis of the criminal and civil actions, their legal characterization and their attribution to their perpetrator. In that event, the civil court may re-examine them when determining the civil rights connected with them. That being so, it is apparent from the criminal order that it convicted the appellant for the incident of damage to the first respondent’s vehicle without addressing the incident of the latter’s injury, which was not before the court that issued the aforementioned criminal order. Accordingly, the common basis of each of the criminal and civil actions differs in the former from the latter, such that the criminal order has no binding authority requiring the civil judge to adhere to it in the civil action. Since the challenged judgment departed from this view and based its ruling ordering the appellant and the second respondent to pay the amount awarded as compensation for the first respondent’s injury on the appellant’s fault being established by the aforementioned criminal order and in adherence to its binding authority, it erred in applying the law in a manner requiring its cassation without any need to examine the remaining grounds of appeal.