Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 240

Summary: - Acquired rights. Must be respected even if acquired through administrative, regulatory or individual decisions. The basis: the dictates of justice and natural law and the requirements of the public interest. The reason. To secure the stability of legal positions, which may not be impaired under the Kuwaiti Constitution. - Determination of family status for acquisition of ownership. The relevant status is that existing from approval of allocation until expiry of the period it specified, with the remaining conditions fulfilled, without regard to any subsequent change thereto. The reason. Such change falls outside the rules it specified for establishing the right to acquire ownership. - The family under the government housing distribution system in force from 26/8/1962. Its meaning. A group consisting of a husband, wife and their children, or some of that group, sharing one household. Its implication. Any individual of that group living separately from it falls outside the concept of the family. This must be observed when allocating these houses, whether upon initial allocation or amendment of the allocation. - Allocation of the government house—the subject of the dispute—to the appellant and her mother and its delivery to them as constituting a Kuwaiti family during 1976, and their obtaining a loan secured by it from the Credit and Savings Bank for its extension and renovation. Its implication. The appellant’s family status for acquisition of ownership was determined from approval of the allocation. Issuance of Minister of State for Housing Affairs’ Decision No. 564/1993 requiring the family entitled to the government house to consist of no fewer than two members. Does not alter this. The reason. It cannot impair the appellant’s legal position, which became settled upon fulfilment of the conditions for her acquisition of ownership of the disputed property. The challenged judgment’s departure from this view. A defect requiring its cassation. Rule: It is established in this Court’s jurisprudence that the principle, under natural law, is respect for acquired rights, even if acquired through administrative, regulatory or individual decisions. This is what justice dictates and the public interest requires to secure the stability of legal positions, which may not be impaired under the Kuwaiti Constitution. Likewise, the relevant family status for acquisition of ownership is that existing from approval of allocation until expiry of the period it specified, with the remaining conditions fulfilled, without regard to any subsequent change thereto, as such change falls outside the rules it specified for establishing the right to acquire ownership. The meaning of family under the government housing distribution system in force from 26/8/1962 is a group consisting of a husband, wife and their children, or some of that group, sharing one household. Consequently, any individual of that group living separately from it falls outside the concept of the family, and this concept must be observed when allocating these houses, whether upon initial allocation or amendment of the allocation. Accordingly, since it is established in the case papers that the government house—the subject of the dispute—was allocated to the appellant and her mother on 19/7/1976 and delivered to them as constituting a Kuwaiti family, and that they obtained a loan secured by it from the Credit and Savings Bank on 30/6/1980 for extension and renovation, the appellant’s family status for acquisition of ownership was determined from approval of the allocation. This is not altered by the issuance of Minister of State for Housing Affairs’ Decision No. 564/1993 requiring the family entitled to the government house to consist of no fewer than two members, since it cannot impair the appellant’s legal position, which became settled upon fulfilment of the conditions for her acquisition of ownership of the disputed property, as explained above. Since the challenged judgment departed from this view and ruled to set aside the first-instance judgment and dismiss the appellant’s action on the basis that she did not fulfil the conditions for housing welfare, contrary to the law, this vitiates it and requires its cassation.