Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 167

Summary: - Causation in criminal matters. A material relationship beginning with the act committed by the offender and connected, in its mental aspect, with the ordinary consequences of his act which he ought to foresee if he commits it intentionally. Establishing this relationship is a matter of fact assessed exclusively by the trial judge without review by the Court of Cassation. The limit thereof. - The victim’s fault does not break the causal link so long as the appellant’s act is the primary factor without which the death would not have occurred. An example concerning intentionally setting fire to an apartment and the female victim’s attempt to escape the flames from the balcony to the balcony of an adjacent apartment, her inability to do so, and her fall to the ground, where she sustained the injuries which caused her death. The challenged judgment correctly concluded that a causal link existed between the act of intentionally setting the fire and the occurrence of death. - This is not affected by the fact that the victim did not die from burning. Reason: Article 245 of the Penal Code punishes intentionally setting fire if it results in the death of one or more persons, whatever the cause of death or demise. Disputing the judgment’s conclusion. A factual dispute which is inadmissible before the Court of Cassation. Rule: It is established that causation in criminal matters is a material relationship beginning with the act committed by the offender and connected, in its mental aspect, with the ordinary consequences of his act which he ought to foresee if he commits it intentionally. This relationship is a matter of fact assessed exclusively by the trial judge. Once he has decided whether it is established or negated, the Court of Cassation has no power of review over him, provided that he has based his ruling on reasons leading to his conclusion—as is the case in the present action. This is not affected by the female victim’s fault—assuming its existence—so long as the appellant’s act was the primary factor without which the death would not have occurred. It is clear from the judgment’s reasoning that it established the causal relationship between the victim’s injuries, which it detailed from the autopsy report, caused by her fall from the balcony of her dwelling while attempting to escape the flames, and the act of intentionally setting fire committed by the appellant, and her death, in its statement: ((As to the defence’s contention that there is no causal relationship between the accused’s act and the victim’s death, on the assertion that she threw herself from the apartment balcony, fell to the ground and died from her injuries resulting from that fall, it is unfounded, given the established principle that the perpetrator is responsible for all consequences of his unlawful act which he could and ought to have anticipated. Judicial decisions have consistently held that the intervention of factors alongside the accused’s act which contributed to producing the criminal result does not negate causation, including the victim’s fault. If it was a fault ordinarily occurring in the circumstances in which it arose, and the accused could and ought to have foreseen it, it does not negate causation. The criterion in this regard is that, for a causal link to exist between the accused’s fault and the harm sustained, it suffices that the court infer from the facts of the case that, but for the fault committed, the harm would not have occurred. Applying that rule to the incident before the court, it is plainly apparent that, had the accused not set fire to the victim’s apartment, she would not have contemplated attempting to escape the flames through the apartment balcony after the fire had surrounded her on all sides and she had become certain that she would inevitably burn to death if she remained inside the apartment. She had no course other than to leave the apartment, and there was no place untouched by the flames except that balcony, to which she rushed. Furthermore, she did not throw herself to the ground to escape the fire; rather, she was attempting to reach the balcony of the adjacent apartment—which is thinking consistent with that of an ordinary person in such circumstances—but she could not reach the balcony of the adjacent apartment and fell to the ground, sustaining her injuries and dying. Accordingly, but for the accused’s act of setting fire to the apartment, the victim would not have resorted to escaping from it in this manner. The accused is therefore responsible for the victim’s death. This is not affected by the fact that the victim did not die from burning in the flames kindled by the accused, because the provision of Article (245) of the Penal Code, when it made the death of one or more persons resulting from intentionally setting fire, whatever the cause of death or demise. From the foregoing as a whole, the court concludes that there is a causal relationship between the accused’s act of setting fire to the victim’s apartment and the victim’s death as a result of falling to the ground while escaping the fire which consumed her entire apartment. This objection by the defence is thus unfounded and deserving of rejection.)). What the judgment established in the manner set out above constitutes a causal relationship between the appellant’s act and the victim’s death. Accordingly, his contention that this relationship does not exist, in the manner indicated in his grounds of appeal, is in truth a factual dispute concerning the assessment of evidence, a matter within the exclusive province of the trial court, whose determination may not be supplanted or disputed before the Court of Cassation.