Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 252

Summary: - A judgment rendered in criminal matters has no res judicata effect in a civil action if it did not determine the common basis of the civil and criminal actions and its legal characterization. - Awarding compensation for injury on the basis of fault established by the penal order and in adherence to its res judicata effect concerning the incident of damage to the car, without addressing the incident of injury, which was not before the court that issued the criminal order: its effect: the common basis of the criminal and civil actions differs, and thus the criminal order has no binding res judicata effect concerning compensation for injury. The challenged judgment’s departure from this view and its award of compensation for injury on the basis of the fault established by the penal order constitute an error in the application of the law requiring its cassation. Rule: It is established in the jurisprudence of this Court that the provision in the first paragraph of Article 54 of the Law of Evidence that “The civil judge is not bound by the criminal judgment except as to the facts determined by that judgment where its determination thereof was necessary ....” indicates that a judgment rendered in criminal matters has no res judicata effect in a civil action in respect of matters on which it did not necessarily adjudicate concerning the facts constituting the common basis of the criminal and civil actions, their legal characterization, and their attribution to their perpetrator. In that event, the civil court may re-examine them when adjudicating the civil rights connected with them. That being so, and whereas it is apparent from the penal order that it convicted the appellant concerning the incident of damage to the first respondent’s car without addressing the incident of injury to the latter, which was not before the court that issued the aforementioned penal order, the common basis of each of the criminal and civil actions accordingly differs in the former from the latter, such that the penal order has no binding res judicata effect requiring the civil judge to adhere to it in the civil action. Since the challenged judgment departed from this view and based its ruling obliging the appellant and the second respondent to pay the sum awarded as compensation for the first respondent’s injury on the establishment of the appellant’s fault by the aforementioned penal order and in adherence to its res judicata effect, it erred in applying the law, requiring its cassation without any need to examine the remaining grounds of appeal.