Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 75

Summary: - Grounds of appeal. They extend to whatever factual or legal grounds the appellant considers conducive to setting aside or varying the judgment under appeal. The appellant is not obliged to state all grounds of appeal in his appeal petition. It suffices to state some of them in concise, meaningful terms removing ambiguity. Other grounds may be added and grounds previously stated in the petition abandoned without being bound by the time limit for appeal or its service. The Court of Appeal may rely on other grounds in ruling in favour of the appellant. Reason therefor. The legislature's intention in requiring the grounds of appeal to be stated in the petition is to ensure the seriousness of the appeal, not to define its scope. Rule: The jurisprudence of this Court has settled that the grounds of challenge by way of appeal extend to whatever factual or legal grounds the appellant considers conducive to setting aside or varying the judgment under appeal, and that it is not necessary to state all grounds of appeal in the appeal petition; rather, stating some of them suffices. The appellant may add whatever other grounds he wishes without being bound by the time limit for appeal or its service. He may also abandon the grounds stated in the petition in favour of other grounds. The Court of Appeal likewise has the right to rely, in ruling in favour of the appellant, on grounds other than those contained in the appeal petition. Since the legislature's entire intention in requiring the grounds of appeal to be stated in the petition is to ensure the seriousness of the appeal, not to define its scope, it suffices, for this statement to be regarded as fulfilled, that these grounds be stated in concise, meaningful terms removing ambiguity. It is established from the papers that the appellant initially brought his action seeking compensation on the basis that the first respondent's liability was established by the criminal judgment in Felony Case No. 334/2000, Salwa Felonies, which convicted the latter, sentencing her to three years' imprisonment with labour and immediate enforcement and referring the civil action to the civil court, on the charge that she issued cheque No. ......., drawn on Kuwait Finance House Bank in favour of the appellant for KWD 68500, without an existing and withdrawable balance, and did so in bad faith. That judgment became final and irrevocable upon the judgment in Appeal No. 974 of 2002 upholding it and the cassation judgment numbered 272 of 2002, dated 20-1-2004, ruling that the proceedings had lapsed. That judgment acquired binding authority in establishing her fault in causing the damage suffered by the appellant, such that it may not be contradicted and what it adjudged must be adhered to. He also relied on the establishment of the second respondent's tortious liability in his official capacity as the superior of his subordinates, because they facilitated the first respondent's escape abroad through the land border crossings immediately upon issuance of the criminal judgment convicting her. He substantiated his action by submitting before the court of the merits photocopies of the aforementioned criminal judgments, a photocopy of the certificate issued by the Director of the Prosecution for Criminal Enforcement Affairs and International Cooperation dated 1-6-2010, stating that the accused (the first respondent) entered the State of Bahrain on 16-5-2010, photocopies of the letter issued by the Liaison Division of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers—General Department of Investigations and Criminal Evidence—dated 25-5-2010, stating that the first respondent returned to her country, the State of Bahrain, and entered it on 25-5-2010, and the certificate issued by the Public Prosecution—Prosecution for Criminal Enforcement Affairs and International Cooperation—dated 2-10-2011, stating that the criminal court's order referring the civil action to the competent court had not been implemented by referring the case file to the Registry of the Court of First Instance to set a hearing for consideration of the action, from the issuance of the final criminal judgment therein until that date.