Kuwait Court of Cassation principle number 201

Summary: - Awarding compensation for injury on the basis of fault established by the penal order and in adherence to its binding force regarding the incident of damage to the car, without addressing the incident of injury, which was not before the court that issued the criminal order. Effect: the common basis of the criminal and civil actions differs, so the criminal order has no binding force regarding compensation for injury. The challenged judgment departing from this view and awarding compensation for injury on the basis of fault established by the penal order. An error in applying the Law requiring its cassation. Rule: It is established in this Court’s case law that the provision in the first paragraph of Article 54 of the Evidence Law that “The civil judge shall not be bound by the criminal judgment except regarding facts decided by that judgment and whose determination was necessary....” indicates that a judgment rendered in criminal matters has no binding force in the civil action regarding matters it did not necessarily determine concerning the facts constituting the common basis of the criminal and civil actions, their legal characterisation, and their attribution to their perpetrator. The civil court may then re-examine them when deciding the civil rights connected with them. That being so, it is apparent from the penal order which convicted the appellant of the incident of damage to the first respondent’s car that it did not address the incident of injury to the latter, which was not before the court that issued the aforementioned penal order. Accordingly, the common basis of each of the criminal and civil actions differs in the former from the latter, so that the penal order has no binding force requiring the civil judge to adhere to it in the civil action. Since the challenged judgment departed from this view and based its ruling requiring the appellant and the second female respondent to pay the amount awarded as compensation for the first respondent’s injury on the establishment of the appellant’s fault by the aforementioned penal order and adherence to its binding force, it erred in applying the Law, requiring its cassation without any need to examine the remaining grounds of appeal.